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NOTES
INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS: A DIFFERENT STANDARD?
The legal position of American Indian tribes continues to pose a
dilemma for the federal government. The reservations, with a total
population of 280,000,1 are in many ways semi-autonomous governments.
Congress and the Executive have never adopted a single, coherent policy
sufficiently strong to effect either stable autonomy or assimilation. In
the face of this indecision, federal courts have generally avoided reaching
decisions with an intrusive effect on Indian autonomy, construing the Con-
stitution and applicable laws to promote as much tribal survival as possible.
Americanization-often termed "civilization"--of the Indian has
long been a major theme of the government and reformers,2 particularly
after the tribal Indian had been contained and ceased to be perceived as
more than an occasionally dangerous nuisance3  Yet the combination of
governmental irresolution, Indian inability and unwillingness to assimi-
late White ways, and the need for some -local administration has precluded
total dismantling of the tribal structure. Self-government has continued
on many reservations. One element of this autonomy is the tribal court,
which resolves many of the reservation's day-to-day disputes. Prior to
the passage of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act,' it was generally as-
sumed that no procedural due process constraints applied to these tribal
courts.5 The 1968 Act, however, made most of the language of the Bill
of Rights applicable to Indian tribes "exercising powers of self-govern-
ment."' The issues raised by this Act are similar to those currently pre-
sented concerning procedural due process requirements for other non-
traditional adjudicatory bodies. The roles of tribal courts in American In-
1. COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 218 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as THE INDIAN] (figures based on 1960 census).
2. See, e.g., W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 1-24 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as HAGAN]; W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 27-97 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as WASHBURN]; Lerner, Reds and Whites: Rights and Wrongs, 1971
Sup. CT. REv. 201, 226 [hereinafter cited as Lerner].
Dissolving the Indian's disregard for personal property was seen as a fundamental
tool for accomplishing this goal-and for acquiring Indian land. Id. at 226.
3. See HAGAN, supra note 2, at 1-26.
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970), set out in part at note 19 infra.
5. See note 10 infra.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
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dian communities and the validity of their use in a comprehensive scheme
of reservation administration are important factors in determining the
constitutional parameters within which tribal courts should operate. This
task of setting limits is further complicated by an element which is lack-
ing in the context of other such bodies: a concern for the survival of In-
dian tribal culture.
THE TRIBAL COURTS AND THE 1968 INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Generally, tribes possess, and usually exercise, full sovereign power
over internal affairs.! This power is subject to Congress' plenary power'
-if exercised-and to any congressional grants of power to state govern-
ments.' It has been generally held that the Constitution does not regulate
the exercise of tribal power."0
Although federal intrusion upon tribal affairs was minimal at first,"
7. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) [hereinafter
cited as COHEN) ; Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REv. 145,
147 (1940) ; Powers of the Indian Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14, 57, 64 (1934) ; cf. Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (exercise of state jurisdiction, without an act of
Congress, cannot be permitted to infringe the Indians' right to "make their own -laws
and be ruled by them.").
On the specific powers of Indian tribes, see generally Indian Rights and the Federal
Courts, supra, at 147-85; Powers of the Indian Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14 (1934).
8. The sources of congressional authority over the Indian tribes are discussed in
COHEN, supra note 7, at 89-91; and Rice, The Position of the American Indian it the
Law of the United States, 16 J. CoMp. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 79 (1934). Principal
sources are the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; federal ownership of western
lands; and "delegation" of power by the Indians by treaties. COHEN, supra note 7, at
89, 117.
9. Cf., e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) ; COHEN, supra note 7,
at 116-21.
10. E.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding the fifth amendment in-
applicable). But cf. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). Colliflower,
decided prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970), held that the
Courts of Indian Offenses can be considered agents of the federal government for juris-
diction to lie under the general federal habeas corpus act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970).
See also note 13 infra.
The basis for constitutional immunity is more or less mechanical. Tribal govern-
ments are neither the federal government, Talton v. Mays, supra, nor are they states.
E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832); Native American
Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). They exercise "in-
herent" power. See note 7 supra. See generally Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal
Justice, and the American Indian, 18 J. PUB. L. 311, 323-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Kerr] ; Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Govern-
inent, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1343, 1346-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Status];
U.S. SoLICITOa FOR THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 396-402 (1958).
11. During the colonial period, there was little intrusion upon tribal administration
of -tribal law; at first because the White settlers were outnumbered, later because the
frontier made avoidance the easiest response. See WASHBURN, supra note 2, at 42.
See generally id. at 27-52; Kawashima, Legal Origins of the Indian Reservation in Mas-
sachusetts, 13 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 42 (1969).
By 1790 only a few tribes had been conquered, see E. SPICR, A SHORT HisTORY OF
THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1969) ; but population pressure and demand for
722
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it has become quite substantial. This intrusion is particularly evident in
respect of tribal adjudicatory bodies. There are three types of such
bodies: traditional courts, 2 Courts of Indian Offenses,"8 and tribal courts.
This note focuses upon tribal courts, the most common adjudicatory body
among tribes ;14 the arguments proposed here would apply to the other
two types with equal or greater validity."
The structure and functioning of tribal court criminal jurisdiction 6
have been strongly restricted. Tribal court jurisdiction now extends only
to offenses committed by an Indian or arising between Indian and Indian
on the reservation."7 Congress has withdrawn the offenses enumerated in
Indian land led to containment and eventually to the Indian Removal Act, Act of May
28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). See generally COHEN, supra note 7, at 53-55;
A. Dnso, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 101-11 (1970); Lerner,
upra note 2, passim; WASHBURN, supra note 2, at 47-74.
The next four decades witnessed little White involvement in Indian affairs; where
the Indian impinged upon White life, the usual response was military violence. See D.
BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971); WASHBURN, supra note 2, at 67-
74. However, the encirclement and subjugation of the Indians in the West made a less
savage method of local administration necessary, and what became known as Courts of
Indian Offenses were established on most reservations. HAGAN, supra note 2, at 25-27.
The Dawes Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1970)), providing for allotment of Indian lands to individuals, was designed to
end tribal insularity and independence, and the Courts of Indian Offenses thereafter be-
gan to decline in importance. HAGAN, supra note 2, at 141. However, allotment was a
failure (primarily because the Indians were not experienced in the ways of private
property), and in 1932 Congress passed the Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization)
Act, Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970)),
designed to help what was left of the Indian tribes to survive. See COHEN, supra note 7,
at 84-85. It was under part of this act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970), that the tribes estab-
lished some fifty-three tribal courts. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 322.
12. The traditional courts exist only on a few Pueblo reservations in the South-
west. The Pueblo tribes are semi-religious, almost theocratic in government. Their
laws are largely unwritten custom. Offenses are usually adjudged by decision of the
tribal governor, in concert with the tribal council. No jury privilege is allowed. See Kerr,
supra note 10, at 321-22; Constitutional Status, supra note 10, at 1357-58.
13. Courts of Indian Offenses are the remnants of the system of local administra-
tion of reservations developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These courts
are governed by the Department of the Interior, see 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1- .37 (1973),
pursuant to its general authority under 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). The judges are appointed
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs with the approval of the tribal council, 25 C.F.R. §
11.3(b), for a four-year term. Id. § 11.3(c). Any member of the tribe may be ap-
pointed so long as he or she has not been convicted of a felony. Id. § 11.3(d). The
courts apply federal law, rulings of the Department of the Interior, tribal ordinances and
customs not inconsistent with federal law, id. § 11.23(a), and the Code of Indian Tribal
Offenses. Id. §§ 11.38- .87. There are only telve of these courts left. Kerr, supra
note 10,°at 321. See also note 44 infra & text accompanying.
14. Kerr, upra note 10, at 322.
15. The Courts of Indian Offenses are created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
see note 13 supra, and as an explicit agency of the federal government are clearly subject
to constitutional restraints. See generally notes 31-54 infra & text accompanying.
16. This note will deal only with criminal due process. The severity of the crimi-
nal sanction, see note 50 infra & text accompanying, makes the procedures for applying
it the benchmark for due process.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1970). At least one tribal judge has begun to assert
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the Major Crimes Act 8 from tribal court jurisdiction, vesting jurisdic-
tion over these offenses in the federal courts.19 At times, Congress has
also permitted states to assume full criminal and civil jurisdiction over
the reservations.2" What remains to the Indians has, in another context,
been termed "residual jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court."
The tribal courts apply tribal laws and customs.22 Before the Act,
professional counsel was proscribed, perhaps to assure some equality with
the usually untrained prosecutor. The accused may be expected to speak
on his or her own behalf. Silence may be considered evidence of guilt.
Appeal is usually to the tribal council, although appeal to a panel of tribal
judges is used in some tribes.
Some of this procedure may have been changed by the 1968 Indian
Civil Rights Act,2 which applied most of the language of the Bill of
criminal jurisdiction over acts by non-Whites committed on the reservation, apparently
because of a jurisdictional dispute with the state. U.S. CoMm'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, THE
SOUTHWEST INDIAN REPORT 42-43 (1973). Even though this appears directly contrary
to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1970), the Department of the Interior has
taken no position on the matter. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1970). The offenses withdrawn are murder, manslaughter,
rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to
kill, assault with a deadly weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, bur-
glary, robbery, and larceny. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). What remains to the tribes is
petty jurisdiction over offenses such as drunkenness. To say that the jurisdiction is
"petty" is not, however, to say that the due process questions are insignificant. Cf., e.g.,
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ; Thompson v. Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960).
20. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1162 (1970). Compare 67 Stat. 588 (1953) with 25
U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970) and 82 Stat. 78 (1968). These delegations were primarily
used during federal attempts to terminate the tribes' special status. It was hoped that
state court jurisdiction would make the Indians a part of the state citizenry.
21. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 214 (1973) (dictum).
22. The discussion of tribal courts here is drawn from Coulter, Federal Law and
Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the x968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3
COLUM. SURV. HUMAN RTS. LAw 49 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as Coulter] ; Kerr,
supra note 10, at 322-23; and Constitutional Status, supra note 10, at 1356-58.
23. No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense;
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Rights and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
tribes. This Act also made federal habeas corpus a means of challenging
convictions rendered in tribal courts.24
The legislative history of the Act provides little guidance for ascer-
taining its intended effect.25 No trend of interpretation has appeared in
the reported cases dealing with the Act." Several commentators have
concluded that Congress probably did not intend to enact the entire case
law of the Bill of Rights, and that the federal courts should avoid con-
struing the law in such a way as to force Americanization upon the tribes."
These writers advocate continuing the judiciary's treatment of the tribes
as sui generis, because construing the Act to apply pro tanto the Consti-
tution with its judicial gloss would go far toward destroying the Indian
tribal cultures.28 This would, in one writer's view, ignore Congress'
"strong pre-existing legislative policy" in favor of tribal autonomy. 9
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any pen-
alty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a
fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
25. But see notes 27-30 infra & text accompanying.
26. Two of the reported cases touched remotely upon tribal administration of crimi-
nal justice. United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1972) (collateral
estoppel; question of identity between federal and tribal governments not reached) ; Lon-
caisson v. Leelity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(2) & (8) limit
tribal action to the same extent that the fourth and fifth amendments limit federal action,
and give rise to an action for damages).
The remainder of the reported cases are concerned with apportionment: Daly v.
United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d
1311 (8th Cir. 1973) ; qualifications of tribal officials: Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) ; and
miscellaneous tribal actions: O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140
(8th Cir. 1973); Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971);
McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) ; Seneca Constitutional Rights Org.
v. George, 348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329
F. Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
There does not seem to be strong tendency to use the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970), to intrude upon tribal affairs. See McCurdy v. Steele, supra,
at 633-34 (the Act's civil rights guarantees "should, where possible, be harmonized with
tribal . . . autonomy ;" and the constitutional import of the language "may be modified"
by the need for tribal autonomy) ; but cf. Loncaisson v. Leekity, supra; Lefthand v. Crow
Tribal Council, supra, at 730 (dictum).
27. E.g., Coulter, supra note 22; Kerr, supra note 10; Constitutional Status, supra
note 10.
28. Coulter, supra note 22, at 75; Constitutional Status, supra note 10, at 1355.
29. Constitutional Status, supra note 10, at 1344-45, 1354. However, the same
writer also seems to recognize the ambivalence of Congress' attitude. Id. at 1344-45 n.8.
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Moreover, these authors say, the tribes lack the resources to meet con-
temporary standards of procedural due process and could be forced to give
up their courts entirely."
Such an approach, however, is inadequate in several respects. It
fails to consider fully the effect of a changed due process standard upon
the individual. Moreover, treating tribal court action as sui generis for
constitutional purposes does not encourage the federal courts to evaluate
procedural due process standards under the more fruitful rubric of the ap-
plicability of the Constitution to entities other than those formally desig-
nated as "government."
TRIBAL COURTS AS INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
There are a number of formulae for considering the applicability of
the Constitution to nongovernmental entities. One of these is the "public
function" doctrine,"' which makes a body occupying a r61e normally per-
formed by the state or federal government" subject to the same constitu-
tional restraints as the government would be.33 The tradition of constitu-
tional tribal immunity34 is no bar to the application of this doctrine. If
constitutionally protected rights such as property rights may be limited,
then tribal rights-inherent but subject to Congress' plenary power-
may be.Y5
30. E.g., id. at 1365-69.
31. The phrase originated in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). See
note 33 inlra.
32. The cases discussed in this section involve mainly state functions and control.
The applicability of the analysis to the federal government is, however, clear. See Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (companion case to Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
33. The foundation case is Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company
town). Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), extefided Marsh to include a shopping center serving as the func-
tional equivalent of the central business district of a town. This development was
limited by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), to picketing related to a use of
the property. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (semble) :
Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject
to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.
Marsh may be limited to situations in which the free exercise of private rights would
result in effective denial of the constitutional rights of others. See Tanner, 407 U.S. at
562; cf. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 320 n.9; Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505. But see Logan Val-
ley, 391 U.S. at 319; Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-03; cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 299.
The analysis here is consistent with such a reading, because any failure to observe con-
stitutionally required procedures in an adjudicatory hearing is an absolute denial. There
is no alternate method of asserting those rights.
34. See note 10 supra.
35. Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ; Nixon v. Con-
don, 286 U.S. 73, 83 (1932) (dictum).
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The public function doctrine, however, is too blunt an instrument for
general use. The classification of a particular function as governmental
or nongovernmental is conclusory,"8 somewhat reminiscent of the govern-
mental/proprietary dichotomy that once ruled the liability of municipali-
ties in tort law." Moreover, in the case of the tribes the doctrine could
be destructive, since tribes would have to conform to a non-Indian model
of government. This overly sweeping effect coupled with traditional
protection of tribal autonomy by the courts, should prevent the invocation
of the public function cases.
A second approach to the applicability of the Constitution to non-
governmental entities is to consider the degree to which a normally im-
mune activity or institution has become a part of a state process. This
approach is illustrated by the Texas primary cases, 8 which denied the
power of political parties to exclude non-Whites from voting in primary
elections. These holdings are based on the principle that where private
activity has become an "integral part" 9 of a state function, whether
through state control" or by the activity's effect upon a state process, 4'
the private activity is "subject to the constitutional limitations placed up-
on state action."4 2  Applying this approach, the inherent power and non-
governmental status of the tribes would be irrelevant, since the issue is
whether an exercise of power by a group not normally subject to consti-
tutional restraints has become assimilated into a governmental function,
thereby making certain constitutional restraints applicable."8
36. Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
37. See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs 979-84 (4th ed.
1971).
38. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). See also Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927) ; Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
39. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944).
40. Id. at 664.
41. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (semble).
42. Id.
43. A caveat should be added here. The authority of the Texas Primary cases, note
38 supra, is limitable in three ways. First, these cases concerned the scope of the fifteenth
amendment, but see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). They might be inap-
posite for less sensitive areas of the Constitution. Second, they deal with classifications by
race for clearly invidious purposes. Third, these cases present a sequence of actions appar-
ently designed to evade the mandates of the fifteenth amendment and the rulings of the
Supreme Court, something the Court is not likely to permit. Cf. Child Labor Tax Case
[Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co.], 259 U.S. 20 (1922) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918). Nonetheless these cases remain the leading authority on a problem distinct from
the issues posed in the more recent "state action" cases. The discussion in this note is of
the integration of an institution formally immune to the Constitution with one not im-
mune. In the later state action cases, the issue is tacit state approval of private dis-
crimination, see, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) ; cf. Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; or perhaps allocation of a scarce resource to
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Tribal courts have become a substantially controlled, small part of
the administration of law and order on the reservation. There are three
elements of federal control. First, as described above, Congress has sub-
stantially limited the jurisdiction of the tribal courts." Second, federal
control is exerted by the 1968 Act,4" which; inter alia, sets procedural
limits on the tribes' adjudicatory processes. These limits, designed to
assure Congress' conception of a fair trial,46 may be compared to the limits
placed by the Texas legislature upon party primaries" to ensure "fair
methods and a fair expression by [party] members of their preferences."8
These limits were sufficient for the United States Supreme Court to find
the political party an agent of the state.49
Finally, the federal government approves the laws enforced by the
tribal courts, since the Secretary of the Interior must approve a tribe's
initial constitution and laws and "may" approve amendments thereto."
Thus tribal laws bear the influence of federal officials, as authorized by
Congress." Under such substantial federal control, the scope of authority
and power of the tribal courts has been so limited and defined that, with-
out regard to the public function doctrine, 2 by a process of functional
delegation they have become instrumentalities of the federal government.
Therefore, the procedural requirements for a fair trial should be deter-
private entities, cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) ; Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Auth., supra.
44. See notes 11-22 supra & text accompanying. An indirect indication of the con-
tinuing importance of this residual jurisdiction, is that the Bureau of Indian Affairs has
provided for Courts of Indian Offenses where usual law enforcement by the tribes has
broken down. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1973). See also note 13 supra.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), set forth at note 23 supra.
46. Cf., e.g., 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1863-67 (separate statement
of Senator Ervin).
47. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 653-56 n.6, 662-63 (1944).
48. Id. at 654, quoting Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 534, 74 S.W.2d 113, 120 (1934).
49. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). In Smith as in Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), there is language concerning the monopoly position of the
formally private group. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). Here again the
analysis of tribal courts is consistent with such a reading. See note 33 supra.
50. In practice, the Secretary usually does in fact pass upon the tribal laws, since
the Bureau of Indian Affairs made this part of tribal constitutions. Constitutional Status,
supra note 10, at 1350 n.33.
51. Also of relevance in evaluating the degree of assimilation of tribal courts with
the federal government are the collateral consequences, such as loss of voting rights, of
conviction of a crime anywhere. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968)
(collateral consequences sufficient to keep appellant's release from jail from mooting
appeal of criminal conviction); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 27-37, 88-92 (1967) ; Note, Civil Dis-
abilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967). In light of such disabilities, discussion of
due process in terms of tribal autonomy, without more, is specious. Deference to tribal
autonomy should not exclude concern for the individual.
52. See notes 31-35 supra & text accompanying.
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mined by reference to the Constitution, not Congress' enactments or a
tribe's beliefs."'
DUE PROCESS AND THE TRIBAL COURTS
If the tribal courts are instrumentalities of the federal government,
two questions arise. First, does Congress have the constitutional power
to use tribal courts as part of its scheme of law enforcement on the reserva-
tion? Second, if it does, may these courts deviate from the procedures a
federal court must follow in trying a criminal case? Congress has power
to use the federal district courts, and perhaps the state courts, to carry
out law enforcement on the reservations." It did not, however, choose to
53. There is also a question whether a tribal court, as an instrumentality of the
federal government, may enforce laws which would be invalid if enacted by Congress.
Under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (made applicable to the federal govern-
ment by Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)), a court may not aid private action which
would be invalid if performed by the state. However, the logic of this decision, especially
in light of subsequent cases, seems to rest on more than simple enforcement. In Shelley,
stpra, the state common law was the basis of the racially restrictive covenant declared
unenforceable. 334 U.S. at 19-20. Later cases have looked for at least as much state
involvement. Compare Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), with Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In the instance of tribal courts, federal in-
volvement with the substantive tribal law consists solely in the Secretary of the Interior's
approval. This alone should not be enough to make tribal law unenforceable, although
Congress could not have passed a similar law. But cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967).
54. Under its plenary power over tribal affairs, see note 8 stpra, Congress could
have enacted its own code for tribal affairs, as it has for tribes without judicial institu-
tions. See note 13 supra. Congress perhaps could also have vested jurisdiction over
cases arising under the tribal laws and customs in the federal district courts. This "pro-
tective jurisdiction" over a class of cases that does not arise under federal substantive
law could be justified here because: (a) Congress has legislated extensively in the area
of tribal affairs and could vest jurisdiction to protect its legislative program; and
(b) Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs eliminates any danger of intrusion
upon reserved state powers. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
469-84 (1956) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ; National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (plurality opinion). See also Greenebaum & Wirtz,
Separation of Powers: The Phenomenon of Legislative Courts, 42 IND. L.J. 153, 189-90
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Greenebaum & Wirtz] ; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in
District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 157 (1953).
Congress may permit states to exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under federal
civil law. E.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Mondou v. New York, N.H. &
H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (dic-
turn). See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 555 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). It has
never been held that state courts may be given jurisdiction over federal criminal cases,
although scholars have argued that they should. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 293 (1928) ; C. Warren, Federal Criminal Law and
the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. REv. 545 (1925) (the latter article does not cite any cases
of a state court enforcing a federal statute involving imprisonment. The argument pre-
sented there is based upon cases involving penal fines, like those provided for by the
statute in Testa, supra). Even assuming complete federal power to delegate general
criminal jurisdiction over federal law to the states (an assumption supported by the
supremacy clause, U.S. CoxsT. art. VI), there would seem to be no reason to extend
this to the tribal courts. Power to delegate jurisdiction to the states would grow out of
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use these forums; rather, it made a non-article III court-a tribal court-
its instrumentality for this purpose. The Constitution limits Congress'
power to use non-article III courts to achieve its goals.5 These limits
are particularly strict in criminal trials. As discussed above, an instru-
mentality of the government cannot escape the constitutional restraints
that apply to the government itself. Therefore, if Congress could not
have created a non-article III court to hear matters now tried by tribal
courts, it cannot allow them, its instrumentalities, to try them.
WHAT TYPE OF COURT?
There are two types of federal courts: article III courts, and non-
article III, or "legislative,"5 courts. The chief differences between these
types of courts relate to the judges and jurisdiction. Article III courts
are presided over by judges with life tenure and undiminishable salary,"'
while the judges of non-article III courts have such tenure and salary
guarantees as Congress wishes. Article III courts exercise only "the
judicial Power of the United States,"5 " while non-article III courts' func-
tions are whatever Congress establishes, including rendering advisory
opinions and proposals for legislative action. The judicial independence
fostered by the tenure and salary requirements of article III protects
both reserved state powers and individual rights against encroachment by
the national government.5" Since federal power over the Indian tribes is
plenary, the concern for federalism is not a bar to use of non-article III
courts. Protection of the individual, however, remains a problem.
Possible justifications for using tribal courts in reservation adminis-
tration may be found in those used to support the use of non-article III
courts in the territories. Despite the language of early cases which
seemed to defer completely to Congress' will,6" it is now settled that the
territorial legislative courts were justified by practical necessity6 and
their temporary status. 2 In 1962, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,6" the United
the general conception of the federal system. See id. It would not and seemingly could
not involve the kind of control Congress has exercised over tribal courts. But c4. Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHA-
Piao & H. WECHSLER, HART & WEcHsLEs's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEm 567-74 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
55. See notes 56-59 infra.
56. The term is from American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
58. Id.
59. Greenebaum & Wirtz, supra note 54, at 188-90.
60. E.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
61. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 543-48.
63. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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States Supreme Court reserved the question whether these reasons would
today justify the use of non-article III courts in the territories, 4 probably
because the territories no longer seem to be nascent states. However, a
tribe's future is completely unsure, and it would be foolish for mechanical
reasoning to force Congress to bear the burden of tenured judges who
may later become useless. If a tribe should resist Americanization and
choose to become a permanently separate entity, the justification of tem-
porary status would not suffice, but a practical need for a flexible system
of local courts may still exist. The requirements of courts of petty juris-
diction may change; for example, legalization or toleration of some wide-
spread offenses could reduce the number of judges necessary to operate
the courts.
Although the Supreme Court has indicated with respect to courts-
martial that it will not readily permit the use of non-article III courts to
handle criminal cases,"0 a recent case suggests that Congress may none-
theless continue to rely on tribal courts. In Pahnore v. United States,"7
the Supreme Court sustained a criminal conviction rendered by a non-
article III municipal court in the District of Columbia. The Court relied
on the historical use of state courts to enforce federal criminal laws, 8 the
need to relieve article III courts in the District of Columbia of the burdens
of trials under laws of local application," and the local impact of the
laws.7 These factors would seem to justify use of non-article III courts
to administer laws of local origin and application on the reservation.
Prejudice resulting from the lack of judicial independence at a particular
trial is better dealt with by a habeas corpus proceeding than by an overly
64. Id. at 548 n.19 (plurality opinion per Harlan, J.).
The other four participating justices, two concurring in the result and two dissent-
ing, did not address this question; perhaps Justice Douglas' inartful dissent, id. at 589, in-
dicates that he would never allow use of non-article III courts for criminal trials.
65. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. It has been suggested that the now large federal
judiciary makes invalid one of the arguments against imposing the requirements of article
III on the territorial courts-that when the territory became a state Congress would
have to continue with unnecessary judges. Note, Legislative and Constitutional Courts:
What Lurks Alad for Bifurcation, 71 YALE L.J. 979, 982 (1962). A tribal court judge,
however, might find the shift from a court of very limited jurisdiction to one of genuine
federal jurisdiction somewhat difficult.
66. The suggestion was made in HART & WrECHSLR, supra note 54, at 397. The
cases relied upon there include O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (military
jurisdiction extends only to service-connected offenses); Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (civilian dependents of United States soldiers may
not be tried by court-martial). But c4. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971)
(soldier's crimes against person on military base are service-connected and thus triable
by court-martial).
67. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
68. Id. at 402; see note 54 supra.
69. Id. at 408-09.
70. Id. at 407-09.
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intrusive" and possibly costly blanket rule. Thus, article III need not
be a bar to Congress' use of tribal courts.
A SEPARATE DUE PROCESS
The question is now whether, and to what extent, the tribal courts-
as instrumentalities of the federal government-may develop a separate
procedure in the trial of criminal cases." This question must be con-
sidered in light of the trend toward a single standard of due process. This
trend is most clearly illustrated by the requirements placed upon the
states. Where once fourteenth amendment procedural due process was
only partially a function of the Bill of Rights," the modern approach is
toward a uniform standard for both state and federal governments."' A
similar unifying trend is apparent for military tribunals,7 administrative
agencies," and juvenile courts."' The bases of this trend seem to be
fuller perceptions of the integrated character of the nation,"' and disbelief
that deviations from procedural due process standards would achieve their
purported goals.' More fundamentally, this trend reflects a belief that,
regardless of the stated goals or exigencies of a particular process, the
71. The President probably would have to appoint the judges with the advice and
consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
230, 257-58 (1839) ; cf. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1879) (dictum).
See generally J. HARIUs, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 17-35 (1953).
72. It has been suggested that the analysis is the same whether under the Consti-
tution or the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970). See Constitu-
tional Status, supra note 10, at 1343. As has already been seen, however, the statutory
approach does not confront the question of article III's applicability; neither does it
force consideration of tribal court procedures within the courts' general jurisprudence.
73. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled, Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
74. The result in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), that states need not
require criminal conviction by a unanimous verdict, while federal courts must retain the
unanimous verdict, does not affect the analysis here. All the justices save Mr. Justice
Powell would, it appears, impose the same standard upon state and federal courts alike.
Justice Powell, whose vote was decisive, would impose different standards because of
historical considerations. Id. at 370. See also note 99 infra.
75. See Sherman, The Civilianization of the Military, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3, 49-51,
59-66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sherman] ; cf. cases cited note 66 supra.
76. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Although Morrissey recog-
nized that different circumstances may require different standards of due process, id. at
481, the dominant factor was that a parolee was threatened with loss of liberty. See id.
at 481-82.
77. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
But cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
78. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968); cf. Sherman,
Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400-03 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Military Justice] ; E. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 187-88 (1963).
79. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1967). See generally id. at 14-31.
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loss of liberty, the stigma and the collateral consequences"° attendant upon
a criminal conviction are substantially the same regardless of the forum
or location in which they are imposed."' The requirements of procedural
due process reflect a balance between the individual's desire to avoid un-
justified imposition of these consequences and society's need to protect
itself against crime. This balance determines the possibility of a wrong
verdict, 2 and the courts seem increasingly to believe that the individual's
interest in preventing such verdicts outweighs the reasons adduced for a
specific deviation from the norm set forth in the Bill of Rights.
Cultural autonomy is the rationale usually advanced for adopting a
different approach to tribal practices.8 3 This rationale may be too far-
reaching. A separate doctrine of law based upon race 4 could, if un-
controlled, become a dangerous tool, potentially destructive to a national
constitution." The unique position of the tribes, however, could prevent
the application of such a doctrine to other groups. The tribes' special
status is indicated by such factors as the complex relationship between the
federal government and the tribes, and the tribes' marginal and isolated
economic system."8 In addition, the tribes cannot be said to be clearly
part of the national society, neither having been assimilated nor having
been permitted to make fully independent decisions about their future.8
80. See note 51 supra.
81. One of the Court's concerns in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), was the fact
that the juvenile proceeding often resulted in more severe punishment for the child than
for an adult committing the same offense. Id. at 29. Cf. id. at 14-31.
82. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) ; cf. Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1972) ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ; Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAIF. L. REv. 929, 947, 954-56
(1965).
83. See, e.g., Coulter, sutpra note 22; Kerr, supra note 10; Constitutional Status,
suipra note 10.
Cultural differences and autonomy appear to have been one justification for the
separate standard for military tribunals. See the discussion in Military Justice, suipra
note 78, at 1401-02, dismissing the theory as no longer fitting the facts. Such a justifica-
tion may have had more validity when military service was mostly a matter of personal
choice. Cf. Sherman, supra note 75, at 6.
84. See notes 13-21 supra & text accompanying.
85. See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48
(1816) ("the . . . necessity of vniforinity of decisions") (emphasis in original).
86. See THE INDIAN, supra note 1, at 62-66.
This sort of argument has not been well-received of late, cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972), perhaps because the solicitousness of the second school de-
segregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), was the excuse for
so much delay. Cf. G. GUNTHER & N. DowLING, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1429-36 (8th ed. 1970). However, the suggestion here is not that practical
difficulties would justify different procedures, but that the exceedingly marginal economy
of the reservations, see THE INDIAN, supra note 1, at 62-66, may indicate a qualitative
difference between the Indian tribes and other groups that might seek special status.
87. The argument is that, given a true choice, a tribe may or may not choose to
follow the American scheme. Some freedom of experimentation during the period of
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These factors make cultural differences and self-determination both be-
lievable and limitable, so that allowing the tribes to develop a separate law
will not necessarily imply a retreat from the concept of a national consti-
tution.
In criminal due process, the goal of cultural autonomy could be pur-
sued in two ways. One approach would be to argue that because of their
different cultures, tribes should be permitted to choose a balance between
protection of the individual and societal needs different from the one re-
flected in the Bill of Rights and the rest of the Constitution."8  Procedural
rules often embody a society's most deeply held values. 9 If the federal-
state standard of procedural due process is to be imposed upon the tribal
courts, the development of their own culture may well be impeded.
Two factors, however, militate for stronger constitutional restraints
upon the tribal courts. First, as instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment, the tribes should not be permitted to function in ways not open to
the government itself.") Second, the effects of a criminal conviction upon
an individual-loss of liberty, substantial social disabilities9 and stigma--
call for adequate procedural safeguards. Even if no social effects of a
conviction existed within a particular tribal society, disabilities imposed
by other governments would still affect any Indian who left the society.
2
choice should be allowed.
This is similar in theory to the rationale of fourteenth amendment due process as
applied to the states prior to the 1950's. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
174 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505
(concurring opinion). The recent trend in this area may reflect a conception that the
states are functionally too interwoven and too settled in form to allow deviations based
upon supposed local differences to remain. If so, it need not apply here. However, to
the degree that this development of what Justice Powell calls "prophylactic rules,"
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 50 (1972) (concurring opinion), rests upon distaste
for the burdens of supervising state adjective law, cf. authorities cited note 99 infra, it
would apply equally here.
88. This approach could take two forms: a bald decision to change the balance for
ideological reasons, or a change because the tribes cannot survive with the luxury of
the protections of the Bill of Rights.
89. Thus, for example, a decision about the admissibility of a certain kind of evi-
dence, obtained, for example, in a manner likely to intrude upon what is called indi-
vidual privacy, is in part a decision about the relative weights to be given to individual
privacy and to society's need to ferret out criminals. It is also a decision about what
sorts of factors may justify letting a possibly guilty person go free.
90. A contrary result would permit Congress to circumvent the mandate of the
Constitution whenever it proved convenient to do so.
91. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also discussion notes 83--84
supra & text accompanying.
92. It may be suggested that tribe members remain with the tribe by choice. This
cannot justify any deviation from the balance. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). It might seem that the argument
in tho text proves too much, since the Constitution reflects many balances between the
individual and society, and thus any change would have to fall. However, where the
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However, an apparent change in the balance between individual and
society may simply be a change in the conception of criminal adjudication.
It has been suggested, for example, that tribal law is rehabilitative in ap-
proach, seeking to reintegrate the individual into society." This rationale
is the basis for the separate standards of due process in juvenile court
proceedings."' The continuing validity of this juvenile court doctrine, at
least as it concerns factfinding, is unclear. 5 Liberty is the paramount
consideration. To force a person to be "rehabilitated" is to deprive him
or her of freedom."0 One may or may not have a right to remain an un-
rehabilitated felon, but in any case, one has the right not to be subjected
to the rehabilitative process unless one really needs such "help." '97
A second, more narrow response to the cultural autonomy rationale
would be to argue that one or another specific procedure, inconsistent with
a particular tribal goal, may be dispensed with so long as the overall bal-
ance between the individual and society is unchanged. 8 This approach
has a greater chance of success. It is similar to that which once prevailed
in the United States Supreme Court when considering state court pro-
cedures, and its apparent demise with regard to states need not compel its
rejection here 9 Under this approach, any tribal practice plainly in con-
flict with the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act would have to fall before
Congress' superior power.0 If no inconsistency is found, the effect of
tribes are not agents of the federal government, there is more leeway for them to pursue
their own goals.
93. See HAGAN, supra note 2, at 11-13; Kerr, supra note 10, at 320.
94. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
95. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) with. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
Morrissey explicitly distinguishes the factfinding and the discretionary r6les, 408
U.S. at 479-80, as does Gault, 387 U.S. at 26-27 (dictum).
96. It is also doubtful whether the procedures required by 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970)
would comport with a nonadversary hearing. But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967)
(dictum).
97. Cf., e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). It may be, of course, that the tribes
have wide latitude to shape members' behavior. They might, for example, be able to re-
quire substantial amounts of community service as a condition of using public goods
(e.g., water), and perhaps even to exact criminal penalties for disobedience of such a
rule. But the tribal courts cannot, as agencies of the federal government, apply such
penalties unless they are shown to be justified.
98. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
99. Such a flexible approach would also comport with the traditional judicial atti-
tude of nonintrusiveness.
However, nondoctrinal considerations of the burden of the federal judiciary may
prevent or limit development of the separate doctrine of due process discussed in this
paper. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1972);
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1960) ; STUDY
GRouP IN THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, REPORT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1973).
100. See note 8 supra. For example, absolute denial of a jury of six in criminal
cases would violate 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970).
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the deviation from the federal standard upon the individual's protection
would then be evaluated.'01
Evaluation of such a deviation involves consideration of two factors.
First is the need for the deviation." 2 For example, the 1968 Act requires
a jury trial, but does not specify whether the verdict must be unani-
mous.10  Since the tribal courts function as instrumentalities of the
federal government, the rule that states need not require a unanimous jury
verdict in all criminal trials0 would not automatically apply. To evalu-
ate the need for a nonfederal standard, the tribe's reason for adopting a
nonunanimous verdict should be considered.0 5 Since the reason would
stem from a governmental philosophy with which the federal courts are
not likely to have had much experience, the burden should be on the tribe
to present a careful statement of the deviation's importance to the system
it is supposed to further, and the reasons the normal federal practice would
be dysfunctional.' Any clear inconsistency between the proposed change
and the tribe's general system would have to meet a heavy burden of
101. These two steps are not one since the general guarantees of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) do not determine their form. Compare Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial mandatory on states for sentences greater
tan six months) with Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (jury verdict need not
be unanimous) and Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury need not consist of
twelve persons). In considering the effect of a deviation upon the individual's protec-
tion it must be remembered that the issue is the degree to which an instrumentality of the
government may deviate from standards that a conventional federal court nust follow-
Furthermore, the method of analysis set out in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969)
-determining what is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," id. at 149, by-
reference to history, id. at 149-54, and the dominant practice among the states, id. at 149-
51 n.14, 154-is useful only because it shows the judgment of these authorities as to the
fundamentality of a particular practice. Indeed, the Court seemed to retreat from the
history/consensus approach in determining what it called the "features" of a jury trial.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99 (1970). It engaged rather in a kind of functional
analysis of the purposes and requirements of a jury. Id. at 99-103. See also Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 415 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
102. Since the only purpose of allowing departures is to avoid unnecessary intrusion
upon tribal choice, a merely arbitrary change, or one based upon pecuniary cost, would
be unjustified. But cf. note 86 supra & text accompanying, suggesting that lack of eco-
nomic development could be a basis for limiting the approach set out in this note to
tribal courts. The point is that, while pecuniary need could not justify a separate doc-
trine, lack of economic integration with the American economic system is an indicator
of a genuinely different society, perhaps not totally tied to the Anglo-American tradition.
103. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970).
104. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
105. This assumes a substantive analysis would be made. Mr. Justice Powell, in
his decisive concurrence in Apodaca v. Oregon, id. at 366, stated that unanimity in federal
criminal trials is "mandated by history." Id. at 370. Whether that mandate would ex-
tend to federal instrumentalities is unclear. See also note 74 supra.
106. Cf. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250-53 (1947) ("accumulated experience"
sufficient to evaluate consistency of administrative action with statute's mandate).
See also Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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justification.'" 7
Second, the effect of the deviation upon the constitutionally pre-
scribed balance between individual and society must be considered. Al-
though the courts are experienced in this area, the fact that a person's
liberty is at stake requires that the tribe also show that the deviation does
not affect this balance. In justifying a nonunanimous jury verdict, for
example, the tribe would have to show that other factors, such as ex-
panded participation on the part of the trial judge, exercised in the ac-
cused's favor, counterbalanced any possible prejudice.
APPLICATIONS OF SEPARATE STANDARDS
The examples that follow consider what constitutional problems are
raised by a particular deviation from federal standards and how the ques-
tion might be resolved. Each involves an issue not explicitly treated by
the language of the Indian Civil Rights Act. In each it has been assumed
that the tribe has made the required showing of need.
Search and Seizure...
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule has two purposes: deter-
rence of illegal police behavior. 0 and protection of judicial integrity.:'
The first concerns not the accuracy of the result reached by the trial, but
the behavior of the tribal government as a whole. The instrumentality
analysis discussed here need not apply to the tribes apart from the tribal
courts. Thus, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not be in-
voked unless the constitutionally based fourth amendment exclusionary
rule applies to the tribes despite their quasi-sovereign status, as opposed
to the tribal courts."' Judicial integrity seems at best a tenuous justifica-
107. For example, tribal governments often function by consensus. Note, The In-
dian: The Forgott n American, 81 H.xv. L. Rxv. 1818, 1826 (1968). A tribe that did
so would have to justify nonunanimity where a person's liberty was at stake.
108. A tribe trying to avoid application of the fourth amendment rule could argue,
for example, that its society did not place much weight on privacy, and that to force
exclusion of relevant evidence would add to the difficulty of maintaining their com-
munal atmosphere.
109. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. Id.
111. If the constitutional search and seizure limitations do not apply to the tribes,
the limits would derive from the 1968 Act 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) (1970). In this case
the exclusionary rule should not be applied. Such an extreme sanction for violation of
a statute should derive only from the express mandate of the legislature.
If, however, the fourth amendment were to apply to the tribes, then the exclusionary
rule would be necessary to deter wrongful police behavior, unless the tribe could show
some other effective means of enforcing the fourth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961) ; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). If it were decided that the exclusionary rule did
apply, the scope of the rule would have to be determined. The law of the fourth amend-
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tion as applied to the states. 112 It alone should not be sufficient to require
application of the exclusionary rule to the tribal courts.
Confessions..
The rule excluding coerced confessions has three bases: unreliability
of coerced confessions,"4 deterrence of undesirable police practices,"' and
a privilege not to be a witness against oneself." The first concern seems
conclusive here, since to admit an unreliable confession would increase
the danger of convicting an innocent person. Deterrence of tribal police
practices does not affect the trial itself, and should be treated as it was in
the discussion above of the fourth amendment. The privilege basis, to
the extent that it exists,"' would have to apply to the tribal courts since
it is a privilege that can be asserted only at trial.
Prior Jeopardy
The prior jeopardy rule is directed against harassment and the
danger that successive prosecutions by the same sovereign will increase
the probability of an incorrect verdict." 8  The tribal government is not
the same as the federal government, although its courts have been made
the latter's instrumentality. The tribes, like the states, have their own
values to reinforce through criminal trials, and likewise, they should be
permitted to prosecute under their own laws, notwithstanding a prior
federal trial."9
Assistance of Professional Counsel 20
Although tribe-provided counsel for indigent criminal defendants
ment is terribly convoluted and confused. See generally Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudica-
tion and the Fourth Amendnwnt: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973),
and no adequate treatment can be made here. It would seen, however, that in determin-
ing whether a "search" was in fact made, the defendant's "justifiabl[e]" reliance, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), would turn in part on the culture of the tribe.
Cf. id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. If applied to the federal courts, it is simply a rule made during the Court's
exercise of its supervisory power.
113. Substantive justifications for departure from the rule excluding coerced con-
fessions do not readily come to mind.
114. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964).
115. E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Recent cases indicate that reliability may be the dominant purpose of the coerced
confession rule. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
116. E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
117. See note 115 vtpra.
118. See generally Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 277-79 (1965).
119. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
120. The 1968 Act provides for counsel at the accused's own expense. 25 U.S.C.§ 1302(6) (1970). Any requirement for unpaid counsel would derive from the Act's
general due process provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970). The tribes might argue that
INDIAN COURTS AND DUE PROCESS
will be among the most onerous of requirements because of its cost, the
burden will have to be assumed. An attorney is necessary to steer the
defendant's case through trial and appeal under tribal rules, which must
include those of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act."21  It is this need for
professional assistance that has led the United States Supreme Court to
require counsel for all cases involving the possibility of a prison sentence.
Therefore, the tribes undoubtedly will be required to provide professional
counsel for those unable to afford it. 2
CONCLUSION
The approach employed here is designed to isolate constitutional is-
sues related solely to procedural due process. It forces consideration of
these issues within a general constitutional framework, at the same time
presenting a procedure which does not require destruction of tribal cul-
ture. The arguments presented relate to the legal determination by a tri-
bal court of whether a person has violated the deep-rooted rules of a tribe.
The same arguments need not apply to the formulation of those tribal
rules. There may be latitude for a tribe to define the relations between
citizen and society, but the decision that a person has violated the basic
tenets of that relationship is too fraught with serious consequences to be
made any less carefully in a tribal court than in an article III court.
PETER W. BIRKETT
to pay for someone's counsel might appear to be giving support to an adversariness that
is not within the tribe's culture, thus subverting it; that it is one thing to permit a per-
son to set him or herself against society, but quite another to support such a move. The
failure to provide counsel would raise substantial equal protection problems which are
beyond the scope of this note.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
These rules also include provisions for federal habeas corpus. Thus, an attorney
for a defendant in a tribal court would be conducting the case with regard to appeal in
federal court, and thus would have to be able to deal with federal law.
122. See Argersinger v. Hamilin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
